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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the agglomeration of economic activities in Italy. By using the Guimaraes et 
al. [2004] version of the Ellison & Glaeser [1994] index, we test the hypothesis that the 
determinants of agglomeration differ in significance, intensity and sign between multinational and 
national firms. The data concerning the agglomeration of 112 manufacturing and mining industries, 
computed over the 686 Italian Local Labor Systems (SLL) in the year 2001, show that some 
agglomeration forces are industry-specific while some others are firm-specific. Indeed, on the one 
hand the industrial concentration and the inter-industry externalities seem to act as centripetal forces 
for all types of enterprises, on the other hand the intra-industry spillovers appear to favor the 
agglomeration of only multinational firms, while acting as centrifugal force both for the clustering 
of national firms and for the co-agglomeration between foreign and domestic enterprises. This result 
suggests that the possibility of knowledge transmission between firms belonging to the same 
industry may discourage the most advanced enterprises to co-locate with the less innovative firms. 
The main policy implication is that a high Intellectual Property Regime (IPR) is preferred to a low 
protection of intellectual property, since in the latter case the co-agglomeration does not occur and 
multinational and national firms do no interact and do not exchange knowledge, while in the former 
scenario domestic and foreign enterprises co-locate, and even if the high IPR limit the transfer of 
knowledge, other mechanisms, such as the labor turnover, may occur and promote knowledge 
spillovers between firms. 
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Introduction 
 
 The distribution of economic activities within a geographic area is one of the most debated 
topic of Industrial Economics. Indeed, the comprehension of the forces that drive the co-location of 
firms in the same geographic unit is a very strategic issue, since it allows to set up policies that are 
capable of attracting a high number of firms in a certain area. As Shaver [1998] notices, to 
understand the determinants of agglomeration is useful not only for policy makers, but also for 
firms that have to decide where to open a new plant, and for researchers, who can better analyze the 
linkage between geographic clustering and performance of enterprises. 
 When dealing with the agglomeration issue several different aspects can be taken into 
account. A first concern may be to find the best way to gauge this phenomenon, since the final 
output can be very different and sometimes conflicting according to the methodological choices 
made to build the agglomeration index. These indexes are used to measure the agglomeration of 
economic activities in different countries, in order to understand whether there are country-specific 
characteristics of agglomeration or, conversely, industries cluster in the same way across all 
countries. Another very debated issue concerns the determinants of agglomeration: the aim is to 
understand what are the centripetal and the centrifugal forces that drive the location choices of the 
economic activities, in order to provide useful advises to policy makers who want to attract firms in 
a given area. Finally, within this last section few other papers try to disentangle the dissimilarities 
between the agglomeration patterns of different typologies of firms, such as multinational vs. 
national enterprises: these authors argue that the agglomeration forces can be not only industry or 
country specific, but also firm-specific, that is they are related to the characteristics of the group 
which the firm belong to1.  
Our article aims to give a contribution to this latter issue of the agglomeration literature. 
Indeed we believe that the strategic choices that bring different types of firms to differ in terms of 
economic and innovation performance also affect their location choices through the determinants of 
the agglomeration. In other words, we may think that some of the variables that explain the clusters 
of firms can act either as centripetal or as centrifugal forces according to typology of enterprises. 
The two groups of firms that we will take into account to test our hypothesis that the agglomeration 
patterns differ according to characteristics of the enterprises are the multinational and the national 
plants, which we may think of as clustering in different ways because of several reasons that will be 
shown in the review of the literature.   
The article is organized as follows. In the first paragraph we present a review of the 
literature, by discussing three of the four mainstreams that are related to the topic of agglomeration: 
the description of the clusters across different industries and different countries, the analysis of the 
determinants of agglomeration, and the analysis of firms-specific determinants of agglomeration by 
distinguishing between multinational and national enterprises. In the second paragraph we will 
briefly discuss the fourth topic concerning the agglomeration, that is the measure of this 
phenomenon, and we will show how we decide to gauge the agglomeration in our paper and why 
we made that choice. In the third part we provide some descriptive statistics to see whether there is 
evidence of different location choices between foreign and domestic plants. The fourth section 
describes the data and the equation used in our econometric analysis. Finally, the last paragraph 
shows the results of our regressions, whose aim is to understand the agglomeration determinants 
both within and between each group of firms, by using two different agglomeration indexes for 
multinational and national plants, and a co-agglomeration index between foreign and domestic 
plants.  
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 In the following sections we will provide more detailed pieces of information concerning the authors who dealt with 
the different issues of agglomeration.  
 The agglomeration in the literature.  
 The literature concerning the agglomeration of economic activities can be grouped into four 
main categories, according to the purpose of the articles, that is: 
- to find the most correct index to gauge the agglomeration; 
- to describe the agglomeration patterns of different countries and industries; 
- to understand what are the determinants of agglomeration; 
- to highlight the differences between industry-specific and firm-specific determinants of 
agglomeration, with a special attention to the dissimilarities between multinational and 
national firms.   
The first topic will be discussed in the next paragraph. We will now focus on the other three. 
 
The agglomeration of countries’ industries. 
In this group we find those authors who use the different measures of agglomeration to 
depict the distribution of economic activities in different industries and countries.  
Ellison and Glaeser [1994, 1997] study the co-location pattern of manufacturing firms in the 
Silicon Valley at 2, 3 and 4 digit and at country, county and zip-code levels. Nearly all the sectors 
turn out to be more agglomerated than their counterfactual ideal situation based on the “dartboard 
approach”, even if only half of the sectors seems to have a high agglomeration (more than 0.5 
points). According to EG, the intensity of agglomeration rises with the desegregation of the digits 
and with the aggregation of the geographic units, but the rank of the sectors’ agglomeration does 
not change.  
Maurel and Sedillot [1999] focus on French industries and find that three groups of sectors 
can be considered very clustered: the mining industry, whose agglomeration determinants are 
natural advantages, the traditional sectors, whose agglomeration pattern depends on past static 
externalities, and the technology industries, which cluster because of the presence of spillovers. By 
comparing their results with those of EG, they find that U.S.A. and France share a similar pattern of 
agglomeration. 
  Guimaraes et al. [2004] look at the agglomeration of 103 sectors at 3-digit level in the 275 
“concelhos” of Portugal, and they find results very close to that of EG. 
  Deveraux et al. [1999] study the agglomeration of economic activities in England at 4-digit 
level and for three different spatial aggregation of the data (Local Authority, Post-code and 
County). The most clustered industries turn out to be the traditional ones and the agglomeration 
pattern of UK results to be close to that of USA and France, at least as regards the industries that 
show higher values of the index, while it differs for the less agglomerated industries.  
Finally, Pagnini [2002] use three different indexes to measure the agglomeration of 100 
industries at 3-digit level in Italy in 1996, and finds that they all agree as far as the most 
agglomerated sectors are concerned, while they give different responses for the lower agglomerated 
industries. As Deveraux et al. [1999], he uses three different levels of aggregation of the data 
(counties, regions and Local Labor Systems) and finds that the traditional sectors are still the most 
agglomerated.  
From these studies, it seems therefore that there are strong industry-specific determinants of 
agglomeration, since the most agglomerated sectors always turns out to be the traditional ones. 
However, there are also some country-specific dissimilarities, since the patterns of agglomerations 
also differ across countries. 
 
The determinants of agglomeration 
A second bunch of authors that deal with the agglomeration issue look for the determinants 
of this phenomenon, with the aim of giving useful advises to the policy makers who want to attract 
firms in certain area.  
From a theoretical point of view, there are three mainstreams in the literature dealing with 
the determinants of agglomeration, that are the Traditional Trade Theory, the Urban and Spatial 
Economics and the New Economic Geography.  
In the traditional trade theory, which is based on the assumptions of constant returns to scale 
and perfect competition, the determinants of agglomeration derive from the determinants of trade 
once that the hypothesis of immobility of capital is removed. Indeed, in the framework of 
Heckscher-Ohlin, the main determinant of trade is the different endowments between countries, 
which bring firms to locate (and to agglomerate) close to the raw materials source as soon as they 
can move. In Ricardo the differences in endowments has to be intended as technology differences, 
but the conclusions are the same. Therefore the presence of natural advantages is considered the 
first main force of agglomeration.  
The New Economic Geography, as developed by Krugman [1991], Venables [1995], 
Krugman & Venables [1995] Ottaviano & Puga [1998], and Puga [1999], move from opposite 
assumptions with respects to the Traditional Trade Theory, since it considers increasing returns to 
scale and identical endowments across countries. Therefore the main agglomeration force becomes 
the exploitation of scale economies, which derives from the concentration of economic activities in 
the same area. On the other hand, transportation costs act as a dispersion force, even if with a non-
monotonic relationship. Indeed, a decrease in transportation costs increases the agglomeration up to 
a certain threshold where the congestion economies begin to prevail and generate a new wave of 
dispersion. Hence the final output depends on the equilibrium among these three forces.  
Finally the Urban and Spatial Economics emphasizes the importance of external economies 
that derive from the co-location of several firms in the same areas. These agglomeration or location 
externalities might be intended either as knowledge spillovers, which originate from a cluster of 
enterprises belonging to the same industry, or as pecuniary externalities, which arise when firms 
belonging to different industries or vertically integrated share common services (e.g. infrastructures, 
administrative services etc.) that make it possible to reduce the production and transaction costs.  
Both types of externalities are seen as agglomeration forces, while transportation costs, 
congestion economies and product varieties (that is an increase in the competition) act as dispersion 
forces. 
 
The empirical papers that tested the hypotheses developed by the theoretical literature 
confirm the validity of the main conclusions of all the three mainstreams.  
The importance of natural advantages is demonstrated by several authors, such as Co [2002], 
who finds a positive relationships with a proxy defined as raw material usage per production value 
added. Rosenthal and Strange [2001] find that all the proxies used for raw materials, for energy and 
for water have a positive impact on agglomeration in U.S.A., even if with different intensities 
according to the spatial unit of the data (zip-codes, county and state levels). Also Alsleben [2005] 
finds that the dummy for the extractive industries is positively correlated with the agglomeration of 
economic activities in Germany, which is measured through the EG index. Guimaraes et al. [2000], 
and Pagnini [2002] use other proxies to account for other natural advantages of a given sector, such 
as the low cost and the high education of workers, which all turn out to be positively correlated with 
the agglomeration of firms respectively in Portugal and in Italy. 
The positive impact of scale economies, which is complementary to the negative impact of 
an high degree of competition, has been tested by not many authors. Co [2001] uses the variable 
Scale defined as value added per plant, while Alsleben [2005] makes use of the Herfindahl index to 
account for the concentration of each sector. Both these authors find evidence of a positive 
relationship of concentration with respect to the agglomeration: therefore the level of competition 
acts as a centrifugal force, while the possibility of exploiting scale economies and concentrating the 
market increases the agglomeration. Alsleben [2005] and Combes and Duranton [2003] explains 
this phenomenon by tying it both to the profits compression caused by the product market 
competition, and to the so-called labor-poaching phenomenon, namely the competition in the input-
market that brings firms to pay high salary in order to keep their workers (or to attract the workers 
of the opponents) and to avoid the turnover costs.  
The transportation costs turns out to be always significant in the equations that test the 
determinants of agglomeration, with a negative sign. Rosenthal and Strange [2001] use as proxy the 
inventories per $ of shipment, since they assume that industries producing highly perishable 
products face higher shipping costs and have less inventories. Pagnini [2002] and Alsleben [2005] 
relate their proxy to the imports and exports of a each industry, and they confirm the negative 
relationship between transportation costs and agglomeration. 
 The congestion economies are seldom considered within the agglomeration analyses, since 
they are not very easy to be measured. Pagnini [2002] and Guimaraes et al. [2000] propose to use 
the cost of land as proxy, since a high price of lands is associated to an high demand of investments 
and therefore to a high congestion. 
Finally, the intra-industry spillovers and the inter-industries externalities have been the most 
tested variables in the analysis of the determinants of agglomeration. The former are generally 
intended as knowledge spillovers, and are measured as innovation per $ of shipment in Rosenthal 
and Strange [2001] and as R&D intensity of each industry in Pagnini [2000], Alsleben [2005] and 
Co [2002]. All the authors confirm the positive relationship with agglomeration, except Alsleben 
[2005] who justifies his result in terms of fear of knowledge transfer: indeed, when knowledge 
spillovers occur in an area, the less innovative firms gain while the most innovative suffer a leak of 
knowledge. This happens through several mechanisms such as the labor poaching, which implies 
not only turnover costs but also the transmission of knowledge among firms, the backward and 
forward linkages between enterprises and the imitation of competitors. All these mechanisms can be 
avoid by not agglomerating: this is the interesting explanation given by Alsleben [2005] and 
Combes and Duranton [2003] for the negative relationship they found between spillovers and 
agglomeration, which will be also tested in our paper.  
To account for other intra-industries spillovers different from knowledge spillovers, such as 
the input sharing that generate pecuniary advantages, Rosenthal and Strange [2001], Guimaraes et 
al. [2000] and Alsleben [2005] introduce a variable called manufactured inputs, which is positively 
correlated with agglomeration since the higher the costs for inputs the more the advantages from 
sharing them.  
Finally, the inter-industry externalities are more difficult to be measured. Rosenthal and 
Strange [2001] as proxy the non-manufactured inputs, which is very close to manufactured input as 
meaning but accounts for inter-industries externalities, while Co [2002] makes use of a proxy for 
business services. On the other hand, Bronzini [2003, 2004] computes a diversity index, which is a 
sort of Herfindahl index calculated as if all the sectors, except the one that is being analyzed, were a 
single big industry: in other words it is like to measure the concentration (or the level of 
competition) of all the other sectors, hence a negative sign of the index means a positive influence 
on the agglomeration. The inter-industry externalities always turn out either to favor the 
agglomeration or not to be significant, and this shows that the inter-industry externalities mainly act 
as centripetal forces since they allow to gain pecuniary advantages.   
 
The comparison between multinational and national firms  
Most of the articles do not disentangle the dissimilarities of the agglomeration patterns 
across different typologies of firms, such as multinational and national enterprises. As Shaver 
[1998] claims, there are both reasons for location similarities and reasons for location differences 
between national and international firms.  
A similar pattern of agglomeration can be observed whenever the drivers of agglomeration 
are industry-specific, that is when they push firms to cluster just because they belong to that 
industry, regardless of the typology of the enterprise: according to Shaver [1998], both the natural 
advantages and the agglomeration economies (intra-industries spillovers + inter-industries 
externalities) act as industry-specific determinants of agglomeration.  
On the other hand, the multinational and national enterprises might follow different patterns 
of agglomeration both within and between each group, and this happens when the determinants of 
firms’ clustering are firm-specific. For instance, Shaver [1998] observes that foreign firms are more 
import intensive and technologically advanced than national firms, and therefore they might look 
for locations that have easy access to imports or that guarantee the presence of specific assets that 
fit to their technology. At the same time, multinational firms that enter a country face some 
disadvantages compared to the U.S.-owned enterprises, since they do not know the market; 
therefore they cluster with other multinational firms by taking their location choices as a 
demonstration effect and by exploiting the high knowledge spillovers that arise from the co-location 
of international enterprises. Furthermore, the location patterns may also differ because national 
firms clustered in the past, while multinational enterprises enter in a second time and are driven by 
new forces. 
 
Shaver [1998] finds evidence of differences in agglomeration patterns between multinational 
and national firms, since it turns out that foreign firms prefer the U.S. countries that are on the 
coast, offer low salaries and have low unionization rate. Therefore he concludes that foreign firms 
should look at the location of the other multinational firms, ad not of the domestic enterprises, when 
they enter a market, while national firms should not necessarily follow the foreign enterprises in 
their location choices since the agglomeration drivers might be very different. The policy makers 
also should set up different policies according to what typology of firms they want to attract.  
Co [2002] compares the determinants of the agglomeration of all the U.S. firms with the 
clustering pattern of foreign-owned and domestic-owned enterprises. The only agglomeration driver 
that is found to be industry-specific are the scale economies. On the other hand natural advantages 
and business services seem to be more important for foreign firms, while knowledge spillovers have 
a high positive impact on the agglomeration of national firms and a low influence on the clustering 
of multinational firms. This might mean that the inward foreign direct investments of U.S.A. are 
driven not by technological spillovers, but rather by the backward linkages that foreign firms fix 
with the local suppliers of raw materials. 
Finally, Duranton & Overman [2003], by using a point-pattern methodology for some 
descriptive statistics, do not find significant differences between the distribution of foreign and 
domestic owned enterprises in UK. Conversely, Hogenbirk & Narula [2004] use a location choice 
model and find not only that the pattern of multinational and national firms are dissimilar, but also 
that the location choices of foreign-owned enterprises differ per home country. Indeed, European 
foreign direct investments favor border regions, which allow to decrease transportation costs and 
which turn out to be more familiar and more culturally similar to the home country, whereas 
Japanese ad U.S. multinational firms follow more simplistic location patterns, by choosing the 
“obvious” regions that offer agglomeration and urbanization economies. However, both MAR and 
Jacobians externalities increase the probability of attracting foreign direct investments. 
  
Other papers just focus on the location drivers of foreign direct investments. Shaver [2000] 
finds evidence that the proxy used to account for agglomeration economies2 is negatively correlated 
with the probability of attracting foreign direct investments in U.S.A.. The explanation provided for 
this evidence is that firms (especially the large ones) not only capture benefits that arise from the 
agglomeration economies, but also contribute to them. Hence the more advanced firms, which 
generally are multinational, prefer not to cluster when the spillovers are too high.  
Conversely, Guimaraes et al. [2000] find that multinational firms are attracted in the 
Portuguese “concelhos” by agglomeration and urban economies in terms both of intra-industry 
spillovers and inter-industries externalities (especially in the service sectors,). Hilber and Voicu 
[2006] look at the distribution of multinational enterprises in Romania, and also conclude that the 
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 The proxy used by Shaver [2000] to account for the agglomeration externalities is the proportion of industry 
establishments that are in the state where foreign plant locates. 
probability of a region to attract foreign firms depends on intra-industry spillovers and on the 
agglomeration economies in the services sector; labor market conditions also matter.  
De Propis et al. [2005] classify the inward foreign direct investments of Italy according to 
the Pavitt [1984] taxonomy3, and find that while the agglomeration externalities matter for all types 
of multinational firms, the urbanization economies are not important at all (except those that arise 
from Milan). Furthermore, the specialization of a region in a given industry, which implies intra-
industry spillovers, acts as centripetal force only for the science based firms and the specialized 
suppliers, whereas the diversified regions, namely the districts, only attract the specialized suppliers 
industries. In general it seems that the intra-industry spillovers attract a multinational firm only 
when they embed codified knowledge, which is more transferable through the linkages with local 
firms compared to the tacit knowledge.  
A similar result is found by Bronzini [2003], who confirms that the inward foreign direct 
investments of Italy are not attracted by districts, because they represent closed systems based on 
tacit knowledge and social relationships that are not easy to enter. Indeed he finds that only the 
intra-industry spillovers attract multinational firms in a region, while the inter-industry externalities, 
that are typical of many districts, are insignificant for foreign direct investments. Bronzini [2004] 
also finds evidence that the specialization of an area is significant for the location choice of all types 
of multinational firms, whereas the diversified regions attract foreign enterprises only in the 
manufacturing industries.  
 
In the following section we will show some different measures of agglomeration used in the 
literature and we will provide some arguments to justify our choice concerning how we gauged the 
agglomeration.  
  
The measure of agglomeration 
The analysis and the comprehension of the agglomeration requires the employ of a specific 
measure able to identify the phenomenon. The measure of agglomeration still represents a very 
controversial subject, since the use of different indexes might give different meanings to the 
concept of geographic distribution of economic activities. In this section we will show our choice 
concerning the measure of agglomeration and the arguments that justify it.  
One of the most used variable are the Location Quotient (LQ) and the Gini Coefficient. The 
LQ defines a region specialized in a sector when the pattern of the regional employment in that 
industry, compared to the pattern of regional employment in all industries, overcomes the pattern of 
national employment in that sector compared to the pattern of national employment in all sectors. 
However, this index yields a result for each pair of industry-region and does not allow either to have 
only one measure of agglomeration for each industry nor to make comparisons across countries.  
 The Gini Index allows to solve this problem by internalizing the geographic dimension 
inside the index and by yielding one measure of agglomeration for each industry. The index, which 
is based on a cumulative sum of the number of employees working in a given sector compared to 
total employment within each region, can assume a value between 0 and 1 respectively in case of 
dispersion or agglomeration of economic activities. However, this index does not account for the 
concentration of the industry, that is, given a certain number of employees in an industry, it can 
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 Pavitt [1984] taxonomy classify the manufacturing industries in four different groups, each of which share the same 
features in terms of sources, patterns and appropriation of innovations, and in terms of entry barriers and average 
dimension of enterprises. The groups are: 
- Supplier dominated industries: textiles, food and beverages, paper and printing, wood. 
- Scale intensive industries: basic metals, motor-vehicles, trailers and semitrailers 
- Specialized suppliers: machinery and equipment, office, accounting and computing machinery, 
medical, precision, and optical instruments 
- Science based: chemicals, pharmaceuticals and electronics. 
 
yields the same output both if the industry is composed of two plants and if the industry is 
composed of N plants4. 
Ellison & Glaeser (EG) [1994, 1997] face this problem with a sophisticated model that not 
only accounts for the concentration of industries through the use of the Herfindahl index, but also 
takes into consideration what are the determinants of agglomeration and how much randomness 
there is in location choices. In other words, they construct an index that is able to compare the 
observed agglomeration pattern with an ideal situation where the distribution of economic activities 
is made randomly, without driving forces, “as if locations are chosen by throwing darts at a map” 
(Ellison e Glaeser, [1994]). This comparison is useful to understand how much the determinants of 
co-location are significant to explain the agglomeration in excess with respect to that generated by a 
situation where firms co-locate nearby not because of special agglomeration forces but randomly, 
e.g. by choosing the region where the manager resides. The agglomeration determinants considered 
in the model are the presence of natural advantages and the knowledge spillovers. 
Nonetheless, Holmes and Stevens [2002] show that, since the EG index is employment-
based and depends on the Herfindahl index, it is affected by the dimension of the plants, that is, 
given the same number of employees and plants, it yields a higher agglomeration index for 
industries whose average dimension of plants is bigger.  
Therefore both Maurel and Sedillot (MS) [1999] and Guimaraes et al. (FGW) [2004] 
suggest to use a plant-based instead of an employment-based index, in order to give the same 
weight to all the plants regardless of their dimension. The final agglomeration index that Guimaraes 
et al. [2004] propose, which is similar to the EG original index but with plants instead of workers, 
is: 
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 Guimaraes et al. [2004] demonstrate that )()( EGFGW VarVar γγ < , since the use of the plants 
instead of the employment allows to obtain an unweighed index, not affected by dimension of the 
firms locating in the geographic units. Given these properties, the FGW and the MS variants of the 
agglomeration index is preferred to gauge the phenomenon with respect to the EG original version, 
and will be used inside this paper to detect the determinants of the geographic concentration.   
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of the region i, while Si is the employment of the same region in sector s.  
  
However, the plant-based agglomeration indexes makes it possible to compute the 
agglomeration either among all typologies of firms or within different groups of firms, e.g. within 
multinational and within national enterprises. Conversely, it does not allow to account for the co-
agglomeration between the two different typologies of firms. In order to be able to study what are 
the determinants of the co-agglomeration between foreign and domestic enterprises, we employed 
the Barrios, Bertinelli & Strobl [2003] variant of the EG co-agglomeration index. Indeed, Ellison 
and Glaeser [1994] show that the EG index computed at 2-digit level is a weighted sum between the 
intra-industry agglomeration, given by plants belonging to the same 3-digit group, and the inter-
industry co-agglomeration, given by plants that belong to different 3-digit groups but to the same 2-
digit classification. Therefore they develop an index that is able to account for the co-agglomeration 
between plants belonging to different industries. Barrios et al. [2003] rearrange this index by 
considering different typologies of firms instead of different industries. The co-agglomeration index 
they obtain is: 
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where s expresses the industry and k the typology of firm, e.g. multinational vs. national 
enterprises. This index turns out to be a measure of how firms with different characteristics cluster 
together, by subtracting the intra-group agglomeration indexes ( ks ,γ ) to the total agglomeration 
)( sG  computed as if all plants belonged to the same group, with the effects of industrial 
concentration being always discounted by the Herfindahl index both for the total (Hs) and for firm-
specific (Hs,k) values5. The firm-specific agglomeration indexes are weighted by 2,ksω , which 
represents the share of employees of each group of firm k  in each industry s.   
The co-agglomeration index can be read in the following way: a high value means that the 
agglomeration of all the plants, without distinguishing the typology they belong to, is higher than 
the group-specific agglomerations, therefore the industry that is being analyzed is mainly driven by 
industry-specific determinants of agglomeration, which affect the firms regardless of the group they 
are part of. Conversely, a low or negative level of the index means that the total agglomeration is as 
high as or lower than the specific agglomerations, hence multinational and national firms do not 
cluster between but within them. In this case we will say that the industry is driven by group-
specific agglomeration forces. 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
Our databases allowed us to compute the agglomeration index of Italian industries both for 
the totality and for different typologies of firms, and to make a first comparison by analyzing the 
dissimilarities among the ranks of agglomeration associated to each type of enterprise.  
 
In the first step we took into account all the firms and we calculated the plant-based FGW 
and MS indexes, in order to assess how similar they are. The computation has been made over 112 
industries by looking at the distribution of the plants across the 686 Italian Local Labor System 
(SLL) in 2001, where the SLL are geographic units similar to the industrial districts. The data come 
from the Italian National Statistics Institution (ISTAT) and refers to manufacturing and mining 
industries, aggregated at 3-digit level. 
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 Since we used the FGW plant-based version of the EG index, also for the co-agglomeration index we computed the 
Herfindahl index as H=1/N, as FGW do. 
The choice of SLL as geographic unit for the calculation of the indexes has been driven by 
the critics that several authors, such as Feser [2000] and Iuzzolino [2004], have moved to the EG 
index. Indeed the spillovers, which are considered to be one of the main agglomeration force in the 
EG model together with the natural advantages, can not been confined into the artificial 
administrative boundaries of the countries, regions and counties, but rather they are linked to the 
social relationships of people, which overcome the administrative borders. The EG index, whose 
construction implies the use and the formalization of knowledge spillovers, appears therefore to be 
biased by the geographic unit chosen. Indeed, the rank of the agglomeration of industries is 
different according to the geographic unit used, because of the different intensities exerted by the 
knowledge spillovers in the different geographic units. The use of the SLL appears to be most 
coherent with the basic assumptions of the EG (and FGW and MS) index: indeed the map of the 
Italian SLL has been shaped by Sforzi according to the movements of the commuters, which are 
considered to be one of the main vehicle of spillover exchange within the broader mechanism of the 
employment turnover. The starting geographic units from which SLL have been mapped by Sforzi 
are the smaller administrative Italian entities, which are called “comuni”:  these units have been 
aggregated into SLL according to the trajectories of commuters flows, and regardless of the 
counties and regions they belong to. Therefore the SLL appears to be a better geographic unit to 
account for agglomeration of economic activities given that spillovers are not delimited by 
administrative boundaries by they follow the relationship among people. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of SLL in Italy.   
If we compare the FGW and MS indexes6 for the totality of firms, we find that they agree in 
assessing that the most agglomerated sectors are the traditional ones, as also Pagnini [2002] do find. 
On the other hand, as regards the less agglomerated industries, the indexes are discordant. Indeed, if 
wee look at table 1, we see that the Spearman correlation, which is computed by comparing the 
ranks provided by the two indexes, is not so high. However, since the mean, the median and the 
standard deviation of the two indexes are very similar, and since the Pearson correlation is very 
high, we can conclude that the two indexes are equivalent and we can make use of only one of 
them. We decided to employ the FGW index since its “raw” agglomeration index discounts the 
share of employment from the share of firms for each SLL, instead of discounting it at the end in 
terms of total sum of all SLL. We think that the first approach yields a measure of agglomeration 
which is more precise than the second one. 
Therefore we will focus on the FGW index. If we look at the distribution of frequency, 
which is reported in figure 2, we see that most of the industries show a value of the agglomeration 
close to zero, while only 10-15% of the sectors displays values higher than 0.05, which is 
considered by Ellison & Glaeser [1994] the threshold above which an industry can be considered 
agglomerated. The most agglomerated sectors are shown in figure 3: as we have already said, they 
result to be mainly traditional industries. In order to assess whether this result is affected by the 
level of aggregation of industries, we also computed the FGW agglomeration index at 2-digit level. 
Figure 4 show that the most agglomerated industries turn out to be again the traditional ones. 
Furthermore, it results that the 2-digit indexes are lower than the medium value of the 3-digit 
indexes that compose each 2-digit industry. This happens because the 2-digit level of analysis 
implies the assemblage and homogenization of industries that are still quite different, hence the 
agglomeration forces are weaker and the firms appear to be much more scattered. However, the 
correlation between the 2-digit indexes and the means of the 3-digit indexes that compose each 2-
digit sectors is 0.827, therefore even if the level of analysis in terms of digits changes, the rank of 
agglomeration is very similar.   
 
In a second step we computed the FGW index for different typologies of firms, by 
distinguishing between multinational and national enterprises.  
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 The FGW indexes are displayed in the appendix, while the MS indexes are available upon request  
Data about multinational firms come from Reprint-ICE, which is a database provided by 
Politecnico di Milano concerning all the inwards (and outwards) foreign direct investments 
occurred in Italy since the end of the XIXth century. The database is firm-based and not plant-based, 
therefore it does not allow to assess the distribution of the plants of each firm across the SLL. In 
order to be able to obtain this information we used the R&S (Ricerche e Studi Mediobanca – 
Madiobanca Researches and Studies) volumes, which contain detailed data about the location of the 
plants of each multinational firm operating in Italy in every year, since 1994. By using these 
volumes we where able to expand our database and to employ 3622 foreign plants to compute the 
agglomeration index for multinational firms. The nationality of these plants is mainly European 
(67%), followed by North America (28%), South America (0,5%), Asia (2,9%), Africa (0,2%) and 
Australia (0,2%). The main investors are U.S.A. (27%), followed by France (17%), Germany (14%) 
and UK (10%). The types of direct investments considered are both green-field (28%) and brown-
field (72%): we will account for this issue when dealing with the determinants of agglomeration of 
multinational firms.  
Data about the distribution of national plants across the SLL in 2001 come from the Italian 
National Statistics Institution (ISTAT). Since the database provides only data about the total plants 
regardless of the nationality of the firm, the national data-set has been obtained as difference 
between the total plants and the multinational plants. The resulting amount of domestic plants upon 
which we have computed the national agglomeration indexes for the 112 manufacturing and mining 
sectors are 595865. 
The values of the indexes are reported in the appendix, together with the value of the FGW 
index computed for the totality of firms. Table 2 compares the mean, the median and the standard 
deviation of the indexes computed for different typologies of firms: what we can immediately 
notice is that the mean and the standard deviation of the FGW index of Multinational firms are 
higher with respect to the values of the index computed for national enterprises. This is a first hint 
suggesting that the two typology of firms might have a different agglomeration pattern.  
This intuition is strengthen by the coefficients of the Pearson correlation, which are reported 
in table 3. Indeed, we see that the coefficient of multinational firms is very low both with respect to 
national firms and with respect to the totality of firms. On the other hand, the domestic enterprises 
seem to have the same pattern of agglomeration of the totality of firms, but this result is basically 
due to the fact that the national firms represent more than 99% of the totality of firms. 
Differences between multinational and national firms in terms of agglomeration pattern also 
arise from the different distribution of frequencies, which are displayed in figures 5 and 6: as we 
can see, the distribution of the domestic agglomeration index is much more homogeneous and 
centered around its mean with respect to the multinational agglomeration index, which is more 
skewed on the right with a much longer tail.  
In order to avoid bias due to the choice of SLL as geographic unit, the agglomeration 
indexes have been computed also at regional and county level both for the totality of firms and for 
each typology of firm. As we can see from table 4, the wider the geographic unit, the higher the 
value of the index: this result is straightforward, since the use of a broader geographic unit allows to 
take into account a higher number of firms, hence the values of agglomeration turn out to be higher. 
Table 5 displays the Pearson and Spearman correlation between different geographic units for 
different typologies of firms. We can see a very high correlation between SLL and counties both for 
national and multinational firms, while the coefficients decrease when considering the region with 
respect to counties and provinces, since the former is a much wider geographic unit than the latter. 
Hence it seems that the choice of the geographic unit slightly affects the index of agglomeration: we 
consider our choice of SLL the most correct because of the reasons explained above. However, the 
other two geographic dimensions also will be taken into account in the econometric analysis.     
 
The final step has been the computation of the co-agglomeration index7. Indeed, until now 
we have considered only the agglomeration patterns of each typology of firm. It is useful to 
calculate also the index that is able to account for the co-agglomeration between multinational and 
national enterprises, in order to understand what are the agglomeration forces that drive the co-
location of different typologies of firms. The most co-agglomerated sectors, which are shown in 
figure 7, still appears to be the traditional industries. 
 
The comparison among the agglomeration of national firms, the agglomeration of 
multinational enterprises and the co-agglomeration of domestic and foreign firms, seems to disclose 
at least two important phenomena. On the one hand, there seem to be agglomeration and co-
agglomeration drivers which are highly industry-specific, that is they affect the localization choices 
of all the firms regardless of their nationality: this is true for the traditional industries, since they 
always turn out to be the most agglomerated sectors for all typologies of enterprises. On the other 
hand, the differences between multinational and national patterns of agglomeration seem to reveal 
that there are some agglomeration forces that are firm-specific, which affect in different ways the 
different typologies of enterprises. In the following sections we will try to understand what 
determinants can be considered industry-specific and what drivers, conversely, act as firm-specific 
agglomeration forces. The analysis will try also to assess what are the centripetal forces that drive 
the co-agglomeration of different typologies of firms. 
 
The equation and the data 
 
In order to understand what are the firm-specific and the industry-specific determinants of 
agglomeration, and what drivers promote the co-agglomeration between foreign and domestic 
enterprises, we employed three different equations. The first has the agglomeration index of 
national firms as dependent variable, the second one focuses on the agglomeration index of 
multinational enterprises, and the third one makes use of the co-agglomeration index. 
The standard equation form is the following:  
 
( ) ssssssss traddummySmallBigWageExtSpillTransH εβββββββββγ +++++++++= _log 766543210
 
 
whereγ  is, from time to time, the agglomeration index of national firms ( NATγ ), the 
agglomeration index of multinational enterprises ( MNEγ ) and the co-agglomeration index ( Coγ ), 
while s is the industry. On the right of the equation we find the explicative variables that have been 
considered to be the main determinants of the agglomeration and co-agglomeration of firms and that 
will be explained in a while. These variables have been computed for the each industry and are the 
same across the three equations, since the aim is to understand how the location choices of different 
typologies of firms are affected by the characteristics of the Italian industries. All the explicative 
variable, as well as the dependent variable, refer to the year 2001: the choice of this year as bench 
mark is due to the huge amount of data provided by the Istat-census, which is made at the beginning 
of each decade. All the dependent variables have been standardized. 
 
H is the Herfindahl concentration index computed for each sector and can be read both as 
proxy for the level of the competitiveness and as proxy for the importance of economies of scale. A 
low level of the Herfindahl index means that the industry is highly competitive, which implies, as 
Alsleben [2005] claims, not only a compression of the profits, but also an increase of probability of 
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labor-poaching. Furthermore, since the concentration of a sector is driven by the presence of 
economies of scale, the Herfindahl index can also be seen as a proxy for the scale intensity of the 
industry, which acts as centripetal force as we know from the New Economic Geography. Hence we 
expect a positive correlation between the Herfindahl and the agglomeration index.  
The Herfindahl index of the each sector has been computed not by using the numbers of 
plants as we did in the plant-based FGW agglomeration index, but by using the number of 
employees of each plant8. However, the ISTAT database provides, for every SLL, not the number 
of employees of each plant, but the number of firms that belongs to each class of employees9. As 
Ellison and Glaeser [1994] claim, in absence of better data, it is reasonable to compute the 
employment-based Herfindahl index by attributing the medium number of employees of each class 
to all the plants that belong to that class.  
The variable trans stands for transportation costs, which are traditionally considered 
dispersion forces. In order to find a good proxy for the transportation costs for each industry we 
used the input-output tables, which are provided by Istat and make it possible to see the flows of 
each industry’s goods used by the other industries as input, by using a matrix. Therefore, to obtain a 
good proxy of the transportation costs, we used the inflows of each industry provided by the three 
transportation sectors identified by Istat (Nace 60: land transport; transport via pipelines; Nace 61: 
water transport; Nace 62: air transport). Since the level of aggregation of the data is 2-digit, we 
distributed the inflows among the 3-digit industries by weighting the data, when possible, through 
the weight of the goods of each 3-digit industry, and through the amount of production of each sub-
industry when these data were not available10.     
The intra-industry spillovers have been measured in terms of knowledge spillovers of each 
sector (Spill). The most used proxy for spillovers (see Pagnini [2000], Alsleben [2005] and Co 
[2002]) is the R&D intensity, measured as R&D expenditures weighted by the value added or the 
number of employees of each industry. In our paper we employed not only the R&D intensity, 
which gauge the R&D inputs, but also the Patents, which is considered a rough measure of the 
R&D output.  
The R&D expenditures used for the R&D intensity index come from the Istat database and 
are provided at 2-digit level. The distribution of the data across the sub-industries has been done 
according to value-added of each 3-digit sector, while the normalization has been done through the 
number of employees of each industry. The patents used to gauge the R&D output come from the 
Crenos (Centro Ricerche Economiche Nord-Sud – Economic Researches Center North-South) 
database, which is provided by Cagliari and Sassari Universities. Also in this case the data were 
available at 2-digit level, therefore they have been allocated across the sub-industries according to 
the value added of the industries, as we did for R&D expenditures. Since the patents are subject to a 
great variance from year to year, we decided to employ the cumulated sum of the inventions 
patented from 1997 to 2001, and to normalize them through the value added of each industry. 
However, the variable of reference to account for the intra-industry spillovers will be the R&D 
intensity. The expected sign of the coefficient of the intra-industry spillovers is generally positive, 
but it might be negative if firms are more scared by the leak of their own knowledge than eager to 
gain advantages from spillovers of other enterprises. 
  The inter-industry externalities (Ext) are the most difficult variable to gauge, since they 
should account for the spillovers that arise from the co-location of firms belonging to different 
industries. Following Henderson et al. [1995], Bronzini [2003, 2004] and Paci & Usai [2006], we 
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, where jz  is the share of employees of each plant j within the industry. 
9
 The classes of employees defined by ISTAT are: 1, 2, 3-5, 6-9, 10-15, 16-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-199, 200-249, 250-
499, 500-999 more than 1000 employees 
10
 The only industries for which it was not possible to have neither the weight nor the amount of goods produced are 
Ateco 23 (Production of Coke, oil refinery, nuclear combustible treatment) and 37 (Recycling). In these cases the 
distribution of the inflows has been made equally across the sub-industries.  
employed the so-called Diversity index, also known as Inverse Herfindahl index, which is a special 
Herfindahl index constructed as if all the other sectors except the one that is being analyzed were 
only one big industry. The formula is: 
 
∑∑
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 where r represents all the industries different from s, and jz the share of employees of each 
plant within its 3-digit sector r. The index is employed-based as the Herfindahl index is, and the 
method through which it has been computed always relies on the classes of employees. The inter-
industry externalities are likely to act as centripetal forces, since the firms belong to different 
industries and hence there is no risk of a leak of knowledge. 
 Following Pagnini [2002], we also introduced the variable wage, which derives from the 
Istat databases and represents the mean of the wage of each sector weighted for the number of 
employees. The salary is one of the instruments used by firms to contrast the turnover of workers, 
which is one of the main vehicle through which spillovers spread. A high salary might reflect a 
strong lock-in strategy implemented by firms, and therefore might have a positive impact on 
agglomeration, since the workers are unlikely to change job because the income effect prevail on 
the substitution effect when the salary is high.  
 To account for the size of firms, whose location choice might be affected by their 
dimension, we introduced the variables Big and Small, which has been used separately because they 
are highly correlated. Following a procedure similar to that of Bronzini [2003, 2004], we computed 
the variable Small as share firms that have less than 50 employees in each industry, while the 
variable Big is the share of firms that have more than 1000 employees in each sector. The sign of 
these variables either positive or negative: indeed, we see in the literature that some authors, such as 
Alsleben [2005], finds that small firms agglomerate more than big ones since they employ more 
creative workers that are difficult to replace, while some others, such as Holmes and Stevens [2002] 
find that there is a positive correlation between the agglomeration and the dimension of firms. 
Coversely, Bronzini [2003, 2004] finds that the size has no importance in explaining the location 
choice of firms. 
We finally employed a dummy for traditional industries11, because of two reasons. The first 
one is that the traditional sectors always appear to be the most agglomerated in every country, 
therefore they must be driven by strong industry-specific determinants of agglomeration, which 
need to be controlled for if we want to disclose the firm-specific agglomeration forces. The second 
reason is that, as Maurel and Sedillot [1999] claim, the agglomeration of traditional industries have 
been driven by forces that depend on past static externalities, which might have completely changed 
at the present time, therefore they require to be controlled for. We expect a positive sign of the 
coefficient of this dummy. 
 
Results 
 The first analysis refers to the domestic firms: the national agglomeration index has been 
regressed on the independent variables, in order to understand what are the determinants of co-
location of Italian plants in the SLL. Results are reported in table 6, where the first two columns 
measures the intra-industry spillovers in terms of R&D intensity, while the other two as patents. 
The number of industries for which it was possible to run the analysis in the first column and 98 in 
the second. The Herfindahl index and the salary have been squared both to reduce their correlation 
with other regressors and to detect possible non-linear relationship of these variables with 
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 The industries that have been considered in the dummy_trad are the Textile (171, 172), the Leather (191 and 192), the 
Ceramic tiles (263) and the Jewellery (362). 
agglomeration: indeed it turned out that the coefficients and the significance of the squared 
Herfindahl index and Wage are much better than those (not reported) of the same variables not 
squared, therefore we decided to employ only the squared proxies. 
 As we can see, the significance and the R-Squared of the model are satisfying. All the 
coefficients, except the intra-industry spillovers and the size of firms, have the expected sign. 
 Indeed the concentration index is positively correlated to the agglomeration, meaning that 
competition act as centrifugal force because of the reasons reported by as Alsleben [2005], while 
economies of scale promote the clustering. Transportation costs are confirmed to be a centrifugal 
forces, whereas the wage turns out to be an instrument that lock-in the workers and raises the 
probability of agglomeration. The strong and positive significance of dummy_trad confirms the 
existence of a special pattern of agglomeration for the traditional sectors, whose cluster might 
depend on past externalities. Finally the inter-industry externalities confirm their positive impact 
(given by the negative sign of the coefficient) on the agglomeration, since they provide inter-
industry externalities without any risk of leak of knowledge. The positive impact of inter-industry 
externalities may also be due to presence of backwards and forwards linkages between firms that 
belong to different stages of the production chain, which brings them to cluster.  
The curios result turns out to be the coefficients of intra-industry spillovers, which is robust 
with respect to the different measures of spillovers (R&D intensity vs. Patents). As we can see, the 
sign is negative, meaning that the spillovers act as a centrifugal force for the agglomeration of 
national enterprises. The result is different from Pagnini [2002], who finds a positive impact of the 
R&D intensity on the agglomeration of the totality of plants in Italy, regardless of the nationality of 
firms. The explanation of such a difference might lie either in the better measure of agglomeration 
provided by the plant-based index, whose variance and reliability is higher than the employment-
based index, or in the nature of intra-industry spillovers, which might be a group-specificity 
agglomeration force by having a different impact according to the nationality of firms. For national 
plants, it seems that the hypothesis of Alsleben [2005], who finds that firms in Germany are more 
scared than attracted by the presence of spillovers because of the risk of a leak of knowledge, is 
confirmed also for Italy. 
 The size of firms also matters for the agglomeration of national enterprises, even if this is 
true only as far as the big industries are concerned. Indeed, the proxy Big is always negatively and 
significantly correlated with the agglomeration, meaning that the bigger the dimension of firms the 
lower the level of cluster. This result might be due to the same explanation provided for the output 
of Herfindahl index and intra-industry spillovers: the big firms are generally more technologically 
advanced and more subject to the labor poaching with respect to small enterprises, therefore they 
may prefer not to co-locate because they fear more the possible leak of knowledge rather than being 
attracted by the possible acquisition of new knowledge.  
  
In order to better understand whether the agglomeration pattern of domestic and foreign 
firms are really different, especially with respect to knowledge spillovers, we run a second 
regression by taking into account only the multinational plants. Results are reported in table 7: the 
data available allowed us to use only 72 industries. The coefficients of the regressions containing 
the proxy for small firms have been omitted, since the results did not change but the variable always 
turned out to be not significant.  
 In the first column all multinational plants are considered, without distinguishing between 
green-field and brown-field investments. This analysis might appear to be incorrect, since only 
green-field investments involve a real location choice, while brown-field investments are made to 
acquire new firms and new assets and does not allow the choice of location. Nonetheless, brown-
field investments are undertaken not only to acquire specific assets, but also to enter new markets: 
hence, given a certain number of firms operating in that market, their location might become one of 
the main determinants of the acquisition choice of the multinational firm, coeteris paribus. 
However, to avoid possible bias due to the presence of both green-field and brown-field 
investments, we decided to control for this difference in the second column: since it was no possible 
to use only the green-field investments, due to their low number with respect to brown-field 
investments, we decide to employ a proxy to account for the number of green-field over the total 
investments for each industry. A positive correlation between the number of green-fields and the 
agglomeration, without any change of the other coefficients, might mean that the forces that drive 
multinational firms to cluster together have a stronger effect when the location choice is “pure”, that 
is not driven by an acquisition but by the decision to open a new plant.  
As we can see from table 2, the Herfindahl index is still positive and strongly significant, 
meaning that also multinational firms are afraid of the competitiveness (and look for agglomeration 
economies), as well as national firms do: therefore we may conclude that the level of concentration 
is an industry-specific centripetal force. 
 The transportation costs seem to be less important for foreign firms, since the lose their 
significance. Hence transportation costs appear to be a group-specific agglomeration force, since 
only national firms take them into account in their location choices. A possible explanation for this 
result is that the multinational firms consider the transportation costs relevant as location 
determinants when they choose in what country to invest, whereas they attach less importance to 
this variable once that they have chosen the country and they have to decide where to settle the 
plant inside this country. 
 The wage loses completely its significance, hence it also can be considered a firm-specific 
determinant of agglomeration., since it affects only the pattern of agglomeration of national 
enterprises. 
 The dummy for the traditional sectors still shows a positive and highly significant 
coefficient, meaning the determinants that drive the agglomeration of these kind of industries are 
the same across the different typologies of firms.  
Conversely, both the inter-industry externalities and the intra-industry spillovers have a 
different impact on the agglomeration pattern of national and multinational firms. Indeed, the inter-
industry externalities exhibit a negative sign but lose their significance: this means that the 
multinational firms are not interested in clustering with other foreign enterprises that belong to 
different sectors, or that they do not establish strong backwards or forwards linkages with other 
multinational firms.  
On the other hand, the intra-industry spillovers12 show a positive and significant coefficient, 
which means that multinational firms are attracted by the presence of knowledge spillovers deriving 
from other international enterprises. This result does not clash with the negative impact that 
competitiveness has on agglomeration: indeed, in this specific case competitiveness act as 
centrifugal force not because of the leak of knowledge, but because of the other aspects such as the 
profit compression and the labor poaching, which have been described by Alsleben [2005] and 
Combes and Duranton [2003]. The impact of knowledge spillovers is conversely captured by the 
coefficient of the R&D intesity, which turns out to be positive. A similar result was found by 
Bronzini [2003], who claims that multinational firms tends to locate in the highly specialized areas 
that provide knowledge spillovers. Hence, both intra and inter-industries externalities can be 
considered firm-specific agglomeration forces, since their impact on agglomeration changes 
between multinational and national firms.  
The positive, even if not significant, sign of the proxy that account for the dimension of 
firms can also be used to strengthen the result that we found for intra-industry spillovers. Indeed, 
the biggest firms are the most technologically advanced and, even if they might suffer a leak of 
knowledge when they agglomerate, the gain in terms of spillovers acquired from other big 
multinational firms might be so high that firms prefer to cluster and to run the risk of a leak of 
knowledge instead of not agglomerating and not receiving any transfer of knowledge. However the 
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 The intra-industry spillovers have been measured in terms of R&D intensity, since this variable is considered to be 
more reliable. However the same results are confirmed by using the patents. 
dimension of firms does not seem to be so important as determinant of agglomeration of 
multinational enterprises, since the coefficient of the proxy is not significant. 
Finally, the positive and significant coefficient of the proxy used to account for the 
greenfield investments, without any change as regards the other coefficients, confirms that the 
agglomeration pattern of multinational firms is further strengthened when the location choice is 
pure and not affected by other motivations that are typical of brown-field investments.  
 
The analyses concerning the national and multinational agglomeration have also been run by 
using the index computed at regional and county level, in order to verify whether the results are 
affected by the choice of the geographic unit, even we consider the SLL the geographic dimension 
that better fits with the hypotheses of the EG model. As it shown by tables 9, the main results 
concerning the role of spillovers and externalities do not change for national firms. As far as 
multinational firms are concerned, the number of industries upon which we were able to compute 
the agglomeration indexes were only 66, hence the regressions turned out to be not significant. 
  
The last regression concerns the co-agglomeration between national and multinational firms: 
the aim is to see whether and how they cluster together. The results of the regression are reported in 
table 8. As we can see, the Herfindahl index still exhibits a positive and significant coefficient, 
meaning that the competitiveness act as an industry specific dispersion force (and that the 
economies of scale act as an industry-specific agglomeration force). Also the dummy for traditional 
sectors confirm its industry-specific nature: indeed both multinational and national enterprises that 
belong to these sectors follow a particular pattern of agglomeration, which bring them to cluster 
within and between each group. 
The transportation costs and the wage definitely lose their significance: this confirms that 
they are group-specific determinants of agglomeration, since they count only for national 
enterprises. 
The most interesting results turn out to be the intra-industry spillovers and inter-industry 
externalities: indeed their coefficients are both significant and the signs confirm the firm-specific 
nature of these different kind of spillovers. In particular, the intra-industry spillovers affect 
negatively the co-agglomeration between national and multinational firms. A possible explanation 
for this result is that foreign enterprises are attracted by spillovers produced only by other 
multinational firms, because they are technologically advanced and generate advantages despite the 
risk of a leak of knowledge. On the other hand, the spillover produced by domestic firms are less 
advanced and do not attract multinational enterprises since they would report a loss (in terms of leak 
of knowledge) bigger than the advantage gained by the acquisition of new but less skilled 
knowledge. Nevertheless, the opposite explanation is also possible: domestic firms might not to 
want to agglomerate with multinational firms to avoid the transfer of local knowledge, which would 
allow the foreign enterprises to better integrate in the market and to become more competitive. Our 
analysis is not able to assess the direction of the causality.    
 The inter-industry externalities appear to be a centripetal force for the co-agglomeration of 
domestic and foreign enterprises. This result shows that multinational (national) enterprises do not 
fear to cluster with national (multinational) firms when they belong to different sectors, since there 
is no risk of a transfer of specific knowledge. Another possible explanation is that multinational 
firms establish backwards and forwards linkage with domestic enterprises rather than  with foreign 
firms, and this explain why the coefficient of inter-industry externalities is not significant for the 
agglomeration within multinational firms while it is for the co-agglomeration between domestic and 
foreign firms. 
The final interesting result is the negative and significant coefficient of the proxy used to 
account for the presence of big firms: as we said for the national firms, the big dimension of 
enterprises increases the loss associated to a possible leak of knowledge, without being offset by an 
increase of advantages associated to the acquisition of new knowledge because of the high 
technology gap between the two typologies of firms. 
 
  
Conclusions and policy implications 
 In this paper we tried to assess whether multinational and national firms differ in their 
agglomeration patterns. There are several reasons to believe that these two typologies of firms are 
driven by different location choices: for instance, Shaver [1998] observes that foreign firms are 
more technologically advanced than domestic firms, therefore they may be attracted by the presence 
of high-quality knowledge spillovers provided by other multinational firms, whereas they might be 
not attracted by spillovers provided by national and lagging firms because they fear a leak of 
knowledge. Furthermore, multinational firms face some disadvantage with respect to domestic 
enterprises when entering a new market, hence they might want to follow the location choice of 
other multinational firms by considering it as a demonstration effect. Finally the distribution of 
national firms might have been shaped by past determinants, which do not play any longer an active 
role as agglomeration forces at the moment of the entrance of multinational enterprises in the 
country.     
 Given these considerations, we tested the existence of different patterns of agglomeration 
between foreign and domestic plants over the 686 Italian SLL in 2001, and we attempted to 
understand what determinants of agglomeration can be considered to be industry-specific, that is 
related to the fact that firms belong to an industry regardless of its nationality, and what forces on 
the contrary appear to be firm-specific, namely connected to the typology of enterprise. In order to 
do that, we used data about 595865 domestic plants, provided by the Istat database, and 3622 
multinational plants, coming from the Reprint database of Politecnico di Milano. All the firms 
operate in the mining and manufacturing industries; the total amount of industries for which we had 
enough data to run our regressions is 98 for national enterprises and 72 for foreign plants, while in 
the descriptive statistics we were able to draw conclusions for 112 industries. 
 Before testing our hypothesis of different agglomeration patterns, we presented a review of 
the literature that dealt with the agglomeration issue, by showing the previous empirical works 
concerning the agglomeration of economic activities in different countries, the determinants of 
agglomeration, and the differences between the location choice of national and multinational firms. 
Then we discussed about the measures of agglomeration provided by the literature during the past 
years. We decided to use the plant-based FGW variant of the EG index, since it allows to decrease 
the variance of the results. We also chose to employ the Barrios et al. [2003] co-agglomeration 
index to account for the agglomeration between the two typologies of firms, since the 
agglomeration index makes it possible to compute only the clustering within each group.  
The descriptive statistics already provides evidence of different agglomeration patterns 
between foreign and domestic plants. The econometrics results confirm our hypothesis. Indeed, the 
variables that we decided to take into account as being explicative of the agglomeration act 
differently according to the typology of firms. Only the level of competitiveness, measured by the 
Herfindahl index, is found to be an industry-specific dispersion force. Transportation costs and 
wages appear to be important, respectively with a negative and positive sign, only for the 
agglomeration of national plants. The inter-industry externalities also can be considered a firm-
specific centripetal force, since they affect only the national firms. However, their significance is 
high also for the co-agglomeration between foreign and domestic enterprises: this results may be 
due to the fact that multinational firms establish backwards and forwards linkages with national 
firms and not with other foreign enterprises. Finally, the most interesting results is provided by the 
intra-industry spillovers, which act as centripetal force for multinational plants, while they are 
negatively correlated both with the agglomeration within national enterprises and with the co-
agglomeration between foreign and domestic plants. This confirm our initial hypothesis that firms 
are afraid of a leak of knowledge when they cluster together other enterprises that are 
technologically lagging: this explains why knowledge spillovers act as centripetal forces within 
multinational firms, that are all technologically advanced, while they become a centrifugal force for 
the co-agglomeration between foreign and domestic plants. This result is also confirmed by the sign 
of proxy for the dimension of firms: indeed, the presence of big firms, which produce more 
spillovers than the small enterprises, act as centrifugal force for national plants, which fear the 
transfer of knowledge, whereas it acts as centripetal force (even if not significant) for multinational 
firms, which prefer to cluster rather than scattering when the spillovers are high.  
However, as regards the output of co-agglomeration, it might be also the case that national 
enterprises escape from foreign firms and not vice-versa, for instance because the former want to 
avoid to transfer the latter some local knowledge that would increase their competitiveness: we are 
not able to establish the direction of the causality.  
 Our results may have several implications, since different policies might be drawn according 
to what types of firms one wants to attract. For instance, policies who favor the transfer of 
knowledge, may promote the agglomeration within multinational firms but not the co-
agglomeration between domestic and foreign enterprises. In this case the inward foreign direct 
investments would lose some of their potential appeal as vehicle of transfer of knowledge, since 
local and international firms that operate in the same industry would not co-agglomerate and 
spillovers, that tend to be geographically bounded, would not occur. On the other hand, policies that 
pursue the protection of knowledge might promote the co-agglomeration between the two 
typologies of firms, even if the transfer of knowledge would be difficult as well because of the high 
protection of the intellectual property regimes (IPR). However, in this last scenario, even if 
spillovers appears to be a weak vehicle of transmission of knowledge, other mechanisms might 
occur, such as the turnover of workers, which also allow the transfer of knowledge. This alternative 
mechanism mainly operates when firms are close, that is when national and multinational 
enterprises co-agglomerate, which happens, according to our results, when the spillovers are low or 
are kept low. Hence, strong intellectual property regimes may trigger other mechanisms of transfer 
of knowledge different from spillovers.  
Policies that favor the backward and forward linkages between national and multinational 
enterprises also promote the co-agglomeration, and this confirms the prominent role of linkages as 
mechanism of transfer of inter-industry knowledge. On the other hand, policies that increase the 
competitiveness of an industries decrease the agglomeration and co-agglomeration of plants 
regardless of the typology of firms. 
 Also enterprises may be interested in these results when deciding where to open a new plant, 
by taking the location choices of the previous firms as bench mark. For instance, a multinational 
firm that want to enter a new market might take the location choice of other multinational firms as 
demonstration effect. Therefore, if multinational firms locate within them and do not agglomerate 
with national plants, this might be a sign that there is a high risk of a leak of knowledge. On the 
other hand, the presence of co-agglomerated area might be a sign that the IPR regime works well in 
that country and therefore the multinational firm might become willing to co-locate with other 
national plants since there is no risk of a transfer of knowledge, even if other mechanisms, such the 
labor turnover, may occur.  
The opposite can also be truth: a national enterprise might prefer not to cluster with 
international firms by taking the absence of co-agglomerated areas as a sign the presence of high 
spillovers, which imply the risk of a transfer of local knowledge that would increase the 
competitiveness of foreign firms. 
 Finally, these results shed further light on the issue concerning the existence of firm-specific 
patterns of agglomeration, which has been not enough explored until now. A future line of research 
might be the comparison between the patterns of agglomeration of multinational firms according to 
their countries of provenience, for instance by distinguishing among Europe, Usa and Japan, as 
Hogenbirk and Narula [2004] did. Another possible future development is to look at the different 
patterns of agglomeration related to other characteristics of firms different from their nationality, 
such as the sizes of enterprises.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Local Labor Systems in Italy 
 
Source: Istat – 8th General Census of manufacturing and services 
 
 
Figure 2 – Distribution of frequency of the FGW index – Totality of firms 
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Figure 3 – Agglomeration indexes of the most agglomerated industries in Italy - Totality of firms. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Agglomeration of Italian Industries computed at 2-digit level - Totality of firms. 
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Note: The orange industries should not be considered, since they are composed of one industry also after being disgregated at 3-digit level. Indeed the 
value of the agglomeration index at 2 and 3 digit level is the same. The Nace code are the following: 10 - Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of 
peat; 11 - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying; 12 - Mining of 
uranium and thorium ores; 13 - Mining of metal ores; 14 - Other mining and quarrying; 15 - Manufacture of food products and beverages; 16 - 
Manufacture of tobacco products; 17 - Manufacture of textiles; 18 - Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur; 19 - Tanning and 
dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear; 20 - Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials; 21 - Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; 23 - Manufacture of 
coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; 24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; 25 - Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products; 26 - Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products; 27 - Manufacture of basic metals; 28 - Manufacture of fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment; 29 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; 30 - Manufacture of office machinery and computers; 31 - 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; 32 - Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus; 33 - 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks; 34 - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; 35 - 
Manufacture of other transport equipment; 36 - Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.; 37 – Recycling.        
Figure 5 – Distribution of frequency of the domestic agglomeration index. 
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Figure 6 – Distribution of frequency of the multinational agglomeration index. 
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Figure 7 – Co-agglomeration indexes of the most co-agglomerated industries 
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Table 1 – Comparison between the FGW and the MS indexes – 109 industries, all firms 
 
FGW Index MS Index 
 Mean 0.02413 0.02268 
 Median 0.00984 0.00996 
 Standard Deviation 0.00194 0.00194 
 Pearson Correlation 0.96685 
 Spearman Correlation 0.60959 
 
  
 
        Table 2 - Comparison between the FGW agglomeration indexes of different type of firms  
 
Totality National firms Multinational firms 
Mean 0.02413 0.02420 0.05139 
Median 0.00984 0.01008 0.01608 
Standard Deviation 0.04393 0.04438 0.13118 
 
 
 
  Table 3 - Pearson correlation among the FGW agglomeration indexes of different type of firms 
 
TOTALITY DOMESTIC MULTINATIONAL 
 TOTALITY  1 - - 
 DOMESTIC  0.9988 1 - 
 MULTINATIONAL  0.2020 0.1889 1 
 
 
 
Table 4 –Mean of the FGW index for each typology of firm and for different geographic units 
 
TOTALITY DOMESTIC MULTINATIONAL 
 SLL 0.02413 0.02420 0.05139 
 COUNTY 0.02830 0.02834 0.06197 
 REGION 0.04957 0.04980 0.07506 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Pearson (Spearman) correlation among different geographic units for each type of firm 
 
DOMESTIC SLL County Region 
SLL 1 - - 
County 0.9529 (0.9363) 1 - 
Region 0.8445 (0.7868) 
0.8575 
(0.8794) 1 
MULTINATIONAL 
   
SLL 1 - - 
County 0.9573 (0.834) 1 - 
Region 0.7281 (0.7433) 
0.7711 
(0.8265) 1 
 
Table 6: Determinants of agglomeration of national firms: OLS results 
Herfindahl_Square 24.72415 *** 25.22925 *** 27.7812 *** 28.21143 ***
Transportation costs -0.2780957 ** -0.2708494 ** -0.2981975 *** -0.3006405 **
Spillovers -0.1480344 ** -0.1421682 ** -0.2077415 *** -0.2070355 ***
Externalities -0.4208288 *** -0.2926963 *** -0.3713089 *** -0.2332945 **
Wage_Square 0.3410405 ** 0.3643497 ** 0.2914197 ** 0.2882443 *
Dummy traditional 2.746897 *** 2.784325 *** 2.843641 *** 2.864792 ***
Big -0.2027954 * - -0.1929035 * -
Small - 0.0547061 - -0.1148863
Cons. -0.9060733 0.8041744 -2.274011 -2.106191
n. of obs. 97 97 98 98
F-Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj.R-squared 0.4986 0.4775 0.5069 0.4875
Notes:***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Gamma FGW National          
(Spill. as R&D 
intensity - Big)
Gamma FGW National          
(Spill. as R&D 
intensity - Small)
Gamma FGW National          
(Spill.  as Patents - 
Big)
Gamma FGW National             
(Spill. as   Patents - 
small)
 
Table 7: Determinants of agglomeration of multinational firms: OLS Results  
Herfindahl_Square 96.95273 * 105.336 **
Transportation costs -0.2599864 -0.2274273
Spillovers 0.2626657 *** 0.2912732 ***
Externilities -0.0620649 -0.0183695
Wage_Square -0.1800914 -0.159746
Dummy traditional 3.497585 *** 3.677916 ***
greenfield quota - 0.3618008 ***
Big 0.0476216 0.1208318
cons. -13.76746 -15.38838
n. of obs. 72 72
F-Test 0.0000 0.0000
Adj.R-squared 0.3789 0.4507
Notes:***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Gamma FGW MNE with 
greenfield variable 
Gamma FGW MNE  
 
Table 8: Determinants of co-agglomeration between multinational and national firms: OLS Results 
Herfindahl_Square 35.0686 **
Transportation costs -0.1788861
Spillovers -0.3283204 ***
Externalities -0.5387326 ***
Wage_Square 0.2612254
Dummy traditional -4.86866 ***
Big -0.5459184 *
cons. 1.5459184
N.obs. 76
F-Test 0.0000
Adj.R-squared 0.4342
Notes:***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Coagglomeration index 
between National & MNE
Table 9: Determinants of agglomeration of national firms at Regional + County level: OLS Results  
Herfindahl_Square 20.83691 ** 22.76852 ** 27.3233 *** 27.1422 ***
Transportation costs -0.1023821 -0.196981 -0.1580213 -0.2335295 *
Spillovers -0.2168305 *** -0.1609977 ** -0.4151176 *** -0.2827195 ***
Externalities -0.2690771 * -0.4011915 *** -0.1909903 -0.345988 ***
Wage_Square 0.2843183 0.2833519 * 0.2825449 * 0.2694156 **
Dummy traditional 1.918376 *** 2.289761 *** 2.030009 *** 2.377243 ***
Big -0.0967393 -0.1650846 -0.0790564 -0.1548182
Cons. -0.2883629 -0.6753821 -2.274011 -2.556793
n. of obs. 97 97 98 98
F-Test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adj.R-squared 0.2647 0.4239 0.5069 0.4696
Notes:***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Gamma FGW National          
(Spill. as R&D 
intensity - Region)
Gamma FGW National          
(Spill. as R&D 
intensity -County)
Gamma FGW National          
(Spill. as    Patents - 
Region)
Gamma FGW National             
(Spill. as   Patents - 
County)
 
 
Appendix 
 
      Agglomeration index γFGW per type of firm, Nace-3, SLL 
 
  
Types of firms  
Nace 
Code                  Industry Total  National  Multinational 
101 Mining and agglomeration of hard coal 0.009661559  0.009661559  . 
103 Extraction and agglomeration of peat 0.012431671  0.012431671  . 
111 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas  0.009462065  0.009462065  . 
112 Service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction 
excluding surveying 0.051914591  0.051914591  . 
132 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium and thorium ores 0.085875529  0.085875529  . 
141 Quarrying of stone 0.024089685  0.023997504  0.082395648 
142 Quarrying of sand and clay  0.005087735  0.005088936  . 
143 Mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals  0.010564488  0.022748656  0.018206336 
144 Production of salt 0.073937352  0.073937352  . 
145 Other mining and quarrying n.e.c. 0.012718004  0.012749779  0.031790029 
151 Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products 0.011776148  0.011712243  0.040397115 
152 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 0.022833072  0.023076373  -0.007191489 
153 Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables 0.013745139  0.013862408  0.008213306 
154 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 0.014694834  0.014711134  0.005563541 
155 Manufacture of dairy products 0.010910638  0.010958439  0.020059276 
156 Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products  0.007463102  0.00744821  0.050744798 
157 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds  0.007662348  0.007476932  0.016996374 
158 Manufacture of other food products 0.003951327  0.003964265  0.002073595 
159 Manufacture of beverages 0.00912258  0.009175388  0.007670963 
160 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.058460589  0.058705637  0.211963265 
171 Textile fibre preparation; textile weaving 0.229675978  0.231866774  0.008342677 
172 Textiles weaving 0.163303503  0.163611383  0.043612418 
173 Finishing of textiles. 0.099901633  0.10001401  0.007341927 
174 Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel  0.005333052  0.005345979  -0.010469995 
175 Manufacture of other textiles 0.017965663  0.018188473  0.00319023 
176 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics 0.021654325  0.021654325  . 
177 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles 0.012997348  0.012974728  0.049175554 
181 Manufacture of leather clothes 0.038326649  0.038326649  . 
182 Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories       0.00463866  0.004644917  0.011157988 
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur 0.012983799  0.013000735  . 
191 Tanning and dressing of leather      0.208008573  0.207905765  . 
192 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery 
and harness 0.086752985  0.086457673  0.686766131 
193 Manufacture of footwear 0.040611145  0.040661911  0.010853248 
201 Sawmilling and planing of wood, impregnation of wood  0.010606276  0.010606276  . 
202 
Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, 
laminboard, particle board, fibre board and other panels 
and boards 
0.014377806  0.01441961  . 
203 Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery  0.00455448  0.004554232  0.032141487 
204 Manufacture of wooden containers 0.003363338  0.003363338  . 
205 Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of 
articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials  0.005314885  0.005314726  . 
211 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 0.010090093  0.010189255  0.004173403 
212 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard 0.002757353  0.002789465  0.004649055 
221 Publishing 0.043952677  0.042699049  0.564068483 
222 Printing and service activities related to printing  0.006904789  0.006894042  0.188286591 
223 Reproduction of recorded media 0.025353273  0.021742423  0.862806658 
       Agglomeration index γFGW per type of firm, Nace-3, SLL 
 
  
Types of firms  
Nace 
Code                  Industry Total  National  Multinational 
231 Manufacture of coke oven products 0.017578146  0.017578146  . 
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 0.006675327  0.006982286  0.000674481 
241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 0.00515778  0.006085616  0.003447416 
242 Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products 0.02274399  0.02642388  0.040212991 
243 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics 0.002401015  0.001830508  0.033188132 
244 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products. 0.069747892  0.064555082  0.111221501 
245 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations  0.007831001  0.007297641  0.039886176 
246 Manufacture of other chemical products 0.012877635  0.012071228  0.036836694 
247 Manufacture of man-made fibres 0.013997685  0.010202216  0.089075575 
251 Manufacture of rubber products 0.016086593  0.016678982  0.00848107 
252 Manufacture of plastic products 0.001804456  0.001804132  0.005670579 
261 Manufacture of glass and glass products 0.009840493  0.010081809  0.006974443 
262 Manifacturing of ceramic products 0.01816799  0.018381768  0.011768131 
263 
Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than 
for construction purposes; manufacture of refractory 
ceramic products  
0.25563938  0.255667911  0.205675941 
264 Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay  0.011848762  0.012320488  -0.005557058 
265 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 0.009311124  0.009970559  0.006750757 
266 Manufacture of articles of concrete, plaster and cement  0.005293402  0.005389566  0.008046413 
267 Cutting, shaping & finishing of stone 0.00987506  0.009865588  0.105696235 
268 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, n.e.c. 0.001666351  0.001639555  0.00559779 
271 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys (ECSC) 0.01420607  0.014438222  -0.057295077 
272 Manufacture of tubes 0.003644061  0.003813644  0.01436749 
273 Other first processing of iron and steel and production of 
non-ECSC ferro-alloys 0.005899518  0.00596852  0.006647423 
274 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 0.009428306  0.010094911  0.013085367 
275 Casting of metals  0.007578045  0.007799815  0.033102614 
281 Manufacture of structural metal products 0.002454081  0.00246245  0.011242268 
282 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; 
manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers 0.003024948  0.003087895  0.011975213 
283 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers 0.03628293  0.032539593  . 
284 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal; powder metallurgy  0.007003361  0.006798213  0.056382416 
285 Treatment and coating of metals; general mechanical 
engineering 0.002178931  0.002180185  0.037440607 
286 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware  0.007278943  0.007347848  0.013035842 
287 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, n.e.c. 0.001485671  0.001490945  0.006156684 
291 
Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of 
mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle 
engines 
0.012012373  0.012499227  0.017844496 
292 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 0.001131684  0.001102524  0.015974465 
293 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery  0.008051044  0.008087167  0.014859185 
294 Manufacture of machine-tools 0.004623022  0.004584282  0.026292243 
295 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 0.002575686  0.002532163  0.013837765 
296 Manufacture of weapons and ammunitions 0.159101903  0.171428928  -0.018461398 
297 Manufacture of domestic appliances, n.e.c. 0.006111845  0.006099023  -0.003562076 
300 Manufacture of office machinery and computers  0.006131136  0.00610193  0.021171623 
311 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers  0.004001176  0.003865317  0.011927744 
312 Manufacturing of electricity distribution and control 
apparatus 0.005604274  0.005396904  0.024228058 
       Agglomeration index γFGW per type of firm, Nace-3, SLL 
 
  
Types of firms  
Nace 
Code                  Industry Total  National  Multinational 
313 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable  0.010394122  0.010700899  0.016190074 
314 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and batteries  0.007771917  0.00793822  -0.008711301 
315 Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps 0.008174328  0.008296603  -0.012882417 
316 Manufacture of electrical equipment, n.e.c. 0.002715926  0.002673853  0.022412549 
321 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other 
electronic components 0.007816075  0.007693691  0.030581546 
322 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and 
apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy  0.004087431  0.004011135  0.045808913 
323 
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or 
video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated 
goods 
0.00791192  0.007393777  0.083985074 
331 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and 
orthopedic appliances  0.004165741  0.004164696  0.068752108 
332 
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 
checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except 
industrial process control equipment 
0.013930115  0.012862693  0.055312084 
333 Manufacture of industrial process control equipment 0.008351555  0.00804364  0.030258201 
334 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic 
equipment 0.020516817  0.020818634  0.030574804 
335 Manufacture of watches and clocks 0.014758055  0.015134755  . 
341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 0.022124551  0.012320958  0.094161489 
342 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; 
manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers  0.006489429  0.006806795  -0.02853026 
343 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 0.026095574  0.026211507  0.029206311 
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.019098109  0.019119366  0.064685896 
352 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and 
rolling stock 0.013078596  0.014204329  -0.006972744 
353 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 0.0169886  0.017511094  0.187464186 
354 Manufacture of motor vehicles and bicycles 0.013686457  0.013778221  0.080769488 
355 Manufacture of other transport equipment, n.e.c. 0.004829726  0.005281949  . 
361 Manufacture of furniture 0.01165034  0.011663006  0.010109047 
362 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 0.042327748  0.042329273  -0.051112249 
363 Manufacture of musical instruments 0.056583063  0.056688542  . 
364 Manufacture of sports goods 0.002946349  0.002796091  0.045466001 
365 Manufacture of games and toys 0.002221427  0.002297468  0.002761942 
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c  0.005045654  0.005058276  -0.009103773 
371 Recycling of metal waste and scrap 0.004674227  0.004683554  0.026743566 
372 Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap 0.0035443  0.003634867  -0.018038309 
 
 
